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Rand and Hickman

26-Nov-09

Update 11/28 : A reader made several relevant points.

1. It’s a dangerous game whenever one starts making inferences from unpublished notes. Clear communication of ideas is incredibly difficult even when one is putting in the effort to make something publishable and generally accessible. In private notes, one’s only audience is oneself — as such, one may write in a shorthand manner which may have a very different meaning when read by somebody else.

2. These quotations were selected by the author for being the most damning that could be found, and are pretty ambiguous (as I pointed out in the discussion below). They’re especially ambiguous in light of point one.

3. I failed to challenge sufficiently the framing of the author’s discussion — this whole frame of whether or not Rand discarded the “Nietzscheanism’” of her youth actually reveals some biases and false assumptions of the author.

Arguably (and this is my analysis now, building off the reader’s comment), the point of contention is *whether* Rand’s philosophy is a faux, watery Nietzscheanism (the mask allegedly slipping off in the quotes discussed below) or something altogether different which was created by someone who happened to have a passing interest in Nietzsche. By not challenging the author’s framing, I conceded too much.

Thanks reader!

Original article follows:

This article was brought to my attention…

In her journal circa 1928 Rand quoted the statement, “What is good for me is right,” a credo attributed to a prominent figure of the day, William Edward Hickman. Her response was enthusiastic. “The best and strongest expression of a real man’s psychology I have heard,” she exulted.
At the time, she was planning a novel that was to be titled The Little Street, the projected hero of which was named Danny Renahan. According to Rand scholar Chris Matthew Sciabarra, she deliberately modeled Renahan – intended to be her first sketch of her ideal man – after this same William Edward Hickman. Renahan, she enthuses in another journal entry, “is born with a wonderful, free, light consciousness — [resulting from] the absolute lack of social instinct or herd feeling. He does not understand, because he has no organ for understanding, the necessity, meaning, or importance of other people … Other people do not exist for him and he does not understand why they should.” (Journals, pp. 27, 21-22; emphasis hers.)
“A wonderful, free, light consciousness” born of the utter absence of any understanding of “the necessity, meaning, or importance of other people.” Obviously, Ayn Rand was most favorably impressed with Mr. Hickman. He was, at least at that stage of Rand’s life, her kind of man.
So the question is, who exactly was he?
William Edward Hickman was one of the most famous men in America in 1928. But he came by his fame in a way that perhaps should have given pause to Ayn Rand before she decided that he was a “real man” worthy of enshrinement in her pantheon of fictional heroes.
You see, Hickman was a forger, an armed robber, a child kidnapper, and a multiple murderer.

Apparently Rand wrote various positive thing about this guy (see the article for more).

My first reaction was, so what? Rand thought silly things when she was in her Nietzschean phase. She hardly was the first person to wrongfully admire a heinous criminal at some point in their lives (see, e.g., the fascination many people have had with Che Guevara)

The author, to his credit, tries to address this:

No doubt defenders of Ayn Rand, and there are still a few left, would reply that the journal entry in question was written when she was only in her early twenties and still under the spell of Nietzsche, that as her thinking developed she discarded such Nietzschean elements and evolved a more rational outlook, and that the mature Rand should not be judged by the mistakes of her youth. And this might be a perfectly reasonable position to take. Unquestionably Rand’s outlook did change, and her point of view did become at least somewhat less hostile to what the average, normal person would regard as healthy values.
But before we assume that her admiration of Mr. Hickman was merely a quirk of her salad days, let’s consider a few other quotes from Ayn Rand cited in Scott Ryan’s book.
In her early notes for The Fountainhead: “One puts oneself above all and crushes everything in one’s way to get the best for oneself. Fine!” (Journals, p. 78.)

This could just be referring to obstacles, not other humans. “Above all” and “everyTHING” in one’s way don’t point towards a terribly damning conclusion.

Of The Fountainhead’s hero, Howard Roark: He “has learned long ago, with his first consciousness, two things which dominate his entire attitude toward life: his own superiority and the utter worthlessness of the world.” (Journals, p. 93.)

This admittedly sounds bad. The world isn’t worthless, and if Rand thought it was, she was wrong.

In the original version of her first novel We the Living: “What are your masses [of humanity] but mud to be ground underfoot, fuel to be burned for those who deserve it?” (This declaration is made by the heroine Kira, Rand’s stand-in; it is quoted in The Ideas of Ayn Rand by Ronald Merrill, pp. 38 – 39; the passage was altered when the book was reissued years after its original publication.)

I’m not sure who Kira is addressing in this early edition quote, but it sounds like the context could be sarcastic (if she is addressing one of the Communists, say). Rand was against sacrifice, and this sounds like a pretty sacrificial idea.

On the value of human life: Man “is man only so long as he functions in accordance with the nature of a rational being. When he chooses to function otherwise, he is no longer man. There is no proper name for the thing which he then becomes … When a man chooses to act in a sub-human manner, it is no longer proper for him to survive nor to be happy.” (Journals, pp. 253-254, 288.)

Rand is saying that our essential capacity is our capacity to think. If we give up that capacity, and lower ourselves to the level of animals, we won’t survive … I suppose the author of the article thinks that Rand is arguing it would thus be ok for a Randian Hero to come and extirpate such a sub-rational life, but I don’t think the text supports the reading.

In Atlas Shrugged, Dagny takes an interest in her brother’s wife, Cherryl, who Dagny can tell is good, but not quite good enough to be strong against the cruel people in the world. She asks her to stay at her apartment one night after Cherryl comes over in the midst of a moral crisis; but Cherryl returns to Dagny’s brother, and winds up killing herself later out of despair.

That, I think, is what Rand is getting at — if you aren’t rational and awake in life, then either your own hand or some cruel evil person or the universe will get to you; the Randian hero the author imagines to be so malevolent and antisocial might actually try and help you out, but they can’t save you from yourself.


As proof that her Nietzschean thinking persisted long after her admirers think she abandoned it, this journal entry from 1945, two years subsequent to the publication of The Fountainhead: “Perhaps we really are in the process of evolving from apes to Supermen — and the rational faculty is the dominant characteristic of the better species, the Superman.” (Journals, p. 285.)

I would argue that Rand’s interpretation of this statement is true: since she is defining what is evolving as our rational faculty, then of course we’re going to become better at reasoning as we go along and figure things out. Again, where’s the connection between this and the naive Nietzscheanism displayed in the Wild Bill Hickman discussion?

Psychiatry and Asperger’s

21-Nov-09

NYTimes has an interesting article on Asperger’s and psychiatric classification:

THE Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric Association, is the bible of diagnosis in psychiatry, and is used not just by doctors around the world but also by health insurers.

Changing any such central document is complicated. It should therefore come as no surprise that a committee of experts charged with revising the manual has caused consternation by considering removing Asperger syndrome from the next edition, scheduled to appear in 2012. The committee argues that the syndrome should be deleted because there is no clear separation between it and its close neighbor, autism.

So Aspie diagnoses have no content? Who knew?
Also, it is humorous the writer sets up this document as their Bible and then discusses the changes they are considering to it …

The question of whether Asperger syndrome should be included or excluded is the latest example of dramatic changes in history of the diagnostic manual. The first manual, published in 1952, listed 106 “mental disorders.” The second (1968), listed 182, and famously removed homosexuality as a disorder in a later printing. The third (1980) listed 265 disorders, taking out “neurosis.” The revised third version (1987) listed 292 disorders, while the current fourth version cut the list of disorders back to 283.

So what a mental disorder is changes according to fashion and societal values? Again, who knew?

This history reminds us that psychiatric diagnoses are not set in stone. They are “manmade,” and different generations of doctors sit around the committee table and change how we think about “mental disorders.”

This in turn reminds us to set aside any assumption that the diagnostic manual is a taxonomic system. Maybe one day it will achieve this scientific value, but a classification system that can be changed so freely and so frequently can’t be close to following Plato’s recommendation of “carving nature at its joints.”

Urgh.

First, a good shake of the fist at Plato and his wretched Essentialism (capital E for irony). Nature has no joints. The taxonomic systems in biology are unavoidably arbitrary to a degree, and have changed over time, though they are useful for certain purposes.

The main issue is not that psychiatry isn’t carving nature at the joints, but that what it seeks to classify is itself dubious. The author is on to something: the fact that the classifications shift so often is an indicator of something. But it’s not an indicator of psychiatry not having gotten down the right methodology yet — it’s that what they’re trying to classify mostly isn’t there. Imagine some superstitious Dark Ages “scientist” being criticized due to his classifications of Demons shifting around all the time; it’d be far better, it is said, far more scientific, if he just adopted some objective principles, like number of horns or tails. This would be missing the point, to put it mildly.

While I’m not quite willing to rule out that some people have something which we might reasonably call mental illness, a lot of the “mental illness” which we medicalize is either caused by really bad ideas (suicidal depression), or is merely a classification foisted on people who are outside of the mainstream (homosexuality as a mental illness, or Asperger’s, or ADHD). Maybe I should reject the whole kit-and-kaboodle, I dunno. But I’m certainly willing to junk most of it. The author, though:

science hasn’t had a proper chance to test if there is a biological difference between Asperger syndrome and classic autism. My colleagues and I recently published the first candidate gene study of Asperger syndrome, which identified 14 genes associated with the condition.

We don’t yet know if Asperger syndrome is genetically identical or distinct from classic autism, but surely it makes scientific sense to wait until these two subgroups have been thoroughly tested before lumping them together in the diagnostic manual. I am the first to agree with the concept of an autistic spectrum, but there may be important differences between subgroups that the psychiatric association should not blur too hastily.

In counterargument to the argument that the distinction doesn’t make sense, he wants to maintain the distinction so he can do tests to see if the distinction makes sense? Is that how it normally works?
If there’s some objectively measurable criteria of Aspieness (say high IQ plus low Emotional Intelligence or whatever), there’s nothing to stop him from doing tests to find what he thinks are Aspies and then doing his research studies. If there’s not, and he needs the diagnosis to exist so that psychiatrists can unscientifically create a pool of candidates for him to do his studies on via their off-the-cuff diagnoses, well, he shouldn’t want to do that research anyways.

The McDonald’s Analogy

18-Nov-09

A redditor is sad he got dumped and asks for an analogy that has been made before to be posted:

I know a girl who broke up with a guy and she told him she wanted to “still be friends.” He said, “No thanks.” She wondered why he couldn’t fall back to being just friends after they had a romantic relationship. I came up with the “McDonalds Analogy” to try and explain it in a simple way that would help all women understand this tough question.
Imagine if you went to McDonalds a lot and ordered a Big Mac Combo meal. A Big Mac, Large Fries and a Coke. You really like this meal. One day, you pull up to the drivethrough and order the Big Mac Combo meal and the girl tells you, “I’m sorry – you can have the Big Mac and the Coke, but you can’t get fries with that anymore.” You think about this for a moment, and sure – the Big Mac is the centerpiece of the meal, but McDonalds has some really good fries and you like their fries with your meal. So you say, “I’ve been able to get fries with that before, why can’t I have fries with my Big Mac combo anymore?” The girls says, “Well, I just think it is better if you only have the Big Mac and the Coke from here on out.”
At this point, a lot of guys are going to go to Wendy’s or BK and see if they can get fries with their combo at that drivethrough window. But there are some guys who REALLY like McDonalds Big Macs and they might think, “If I keep coming here and ordering the Big Mac and Coke, maybe she’ll change her mind and give me some fries with that later.” So they will keep on getting the combo without the fries until the deal breaker happens: One day that guy is going to order the Big Mac and Coke and then he’s going to pull up a little bit to pay, and someone else is going to pull up to the drivethrough speaker and order the “Big Mac Combo” and he is going to hear the girl say, “Would you like fries with that?”
That’s why guys don’t like to be friends with a girl who breaks up with them.

This example illustrates well why romance memes suck. The premise is that even though the person very much likes the friendship, he is going to end it because … because the other person finds sex with them uninteresting? How does this make sense?
One way it makes sense is if you see the other person’s sexual rejection of you as some kind of value judgment of your worthiness, which only makes sense if you partially define your worthiness by how sexually attracted some people are to you.
Because of this poor basis for self-esteem, people will often spend great energy trying to do things to make themselves more desirable to other particular people, as a kind of validation of their own purpose and worthiness. This is silly.
If a person who I enjoy playing Super Smash Brothers with decides they are no longer interested in battling me (because their skill level far exceeds mine or whatever), I shouldn’t try and improve my skill so that they will decide to start battling me again in the future; anchoring my self-esteem so closely to someone else’s desire to engage in a particular activity with me is silly. If being good at Smash is something I value, I should work on improving my skills because of that, because of its value to me; it may eventually be the case that, if I improve enough, the other person will want me to battle with them again. But that shouldn’t be the goal.

Joint Custody Always Better?

15-Nov-09

One thing I’ve taken for granted in the past is that two parents are better for a child than one — helping kids is tough, and it seems as though the more help, the better.

There is an issue with this. Three people helping a child is better than two, and four better than three, and so on; there’s no reason to cut it off at the number that seems justified by biology.

But even when you get to two people, the potential for conflict over how to raise the child, what ideas to impart, etc., can be quite serious, and damaging for the child. There’s nothing wrong, of course, with the child having lots of people who want to help them in their lives, but there are serious problems with having multiple people with responsibility for the child in a legal sense.

It’s become an article of faith in the West that even when parents separate, the ideal is for both parents to maintain their relationship with and authority over the child. The old approach was for the mother to get sole custody, a sexist old norm we’ve thankfully been moving away from. But the new approach can be very complicated if the parents have very different ideas about parenting, and among the subgroup of parents that feel the need to divorce, this is probably somewhat more likely to be the case.

Japan has a different solution:

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/11/11/japan.custody.battle/index.html

A guy who was separated from his wife tried to sneak kids out of Japan and failed. That is not the relevant part. This is what I found interesting: “Japanese law follows a tradition of sole-custody divorces. When a couple splits, one parent typically makes a complete and lifelong break from the children.”

Sounds harsh, and bad. There’s no reason one parent should have to make a lifelong break from the child if the child still wants the parent in their lives to some degree

This is an interesting example though, because it shows that the presumption that things like joint custody are good (or at least, better than the alternative if they are viable) is certainly not a universal one. And I’d bet the Japanese tradition evolved to avoid some of the sorts of problems that are encountered when you do it our way (though I could be wrong).

The strength of the presumption towards sharing legal responsibility for children doesn’t only apply in cases of divorce – the presumption that both parents should be substantially involved in a child’s life is so strong that even neglectful parents who reappear after long stretches of absenteeism are often presumed to have a valuable influence to impart in their child’s lives and a right to exercise authority over the same. This isn’t even a presumption granted to anyone with a biological claim – for sperm donors and parents who give their children up for adoption aren’t allowed to enter or re-enter the lives of their biological offspring. Perhaps this is in recognition of the problems having too many people with claim of authority over a child’s life can cause.

It’s also interesting how much this presumption has held given that both parents working is the norm. Having a dedicated child-raising parent makes a certain amount of sense, but if much of the child-raising duties are being outsourced to other actors anyways, what’s the big deal?

Ultimately, the value of the presumption towards joint custody and authority of multiple parents (potentially increasing the amount of help a child can get) has to be assessed against its very serious cost.

One alternative to consider is a norm placing responsibility for every child in the hands of one parent at birth. This would reduce the amount of destructive fighting, damage to child, and state oversight needed over custody disputes, etc.

This would have to be part of a broader cultural shift, of course; it wouldn’t work if it were statutorily imposed for a couple of reasons. The first is that a major issue with sole custody as it presently functions is one parent trying to override the child’s preferences to see the other parent – a cultural norm towards sole responsibility would require parents to take their children’s preferences much more seriously to avoid this outcome. Another problem is that people might not take the assignment of responsibility very seriously. (It would function like a mandatory custody pre-nuptial agreement, and since people are irrationally optimistic about future, they would delegate the responsibility carelessly, and then eventually litigate it, and courts will allow litigation because they want to do what is best for child now; back at square one.)

Perhaps a more realistic improvement is for the default to go back to sole custody after divorce, but in a non-sexist way? The issue with this, of course, is that while you avoid some of the problems of joint custody, you magnify the potential problems of the judge making the custody decision getting it “wrong.” If one parent has sole custody, but child likes other parent more, the child is more unhappy, whereas if you have joint custody, at least child is happy some of the time. (Of course, if the child winds up with the parent they like, that’s great, and maybe you could increase the likelihood of that by taking children’s preferences more seriously, but it’s a crapshoot in the current system). Also, judges are likely to be biased towards the more coercive parent to begin with (since “structure” and “discipline” are supposedly good things), compounding the problems with this approach.

Do people have other ideas?

Focus, Thank You Letters, and Politeness Memes

13-Nov-09

Sometimes I get an email with something I requested (an answer, or a document), and I wonder if I should respond with a thanks.

On the one hand, people apparently like being thanked. And if it’s done in the same sort of communication (like, real time chat, in person or phone convo) it seems like a good thing to do. It even conveys a bit of information –  letting person know you are appreciative or whatever.

On the other hand, getting an email steals a bit of a person’s focus and attention for a few seconds, and that almost seems *disrespectful* if one is not conveying much content.

To take one example of this, thank you notes (even electronic ones) after interviews are very highly recommended in terms of getting jobs, and this always struck me as kind of funny.

Presumably, I am thankful for the interview; if I wasn’t interested in working for your company, I would not have done the interview in the first place!

It seems a bit silly, then, to send a largely contentless letter or email stating the obvious to someone who is probably very, very busy.

The Exaltedness of Blameworthiness

11-Nov-09

Revision 1

People think certain traits are inherent, even when they cause harm.

Why? Sometimes genes are blamed. Sometimes no real explanation is put forth.

  • Examples: A person who eats to excess might blame genes. A person who has a temper, and knows this is bad, may say “that’s just the way I am.”

Sometimes people will deny that the trait is bad, and make a claim that diversity is good, even when it includes bad things.

  • Example: a depressed person will say “Well, it takes all kinds. Happy people, sad people. Many great artists were depressed. This shows that being depressed is good.”

The failure to appreciate memes’ superior role relative to genes in affecting personality, and the (somewhat morally relativistic) overvaluation of differences in personality, are both topics that deserve and will receive their own analyses in future posts.

For today’s post, though, I want to focus on one aspect of people’s way of thinking about traits and problem solving I think is important. It is a psychological reason I think all these memes are so successful in preventing people from thinking clearly about how to improve their lives and fix their defective ideas.

The issue that I see is this: people would rather be off the hook morally than solve the problem. They think that being wrong indicates badness. They don’t want to be bad.

If they buy the premise that the behavior is bad, criticism of their behavior is seen as pointless victim blaming. They can’t change it.

What they’ve failed to understand is that rational criticism is a tremendously more optimistic scenario. The implication of their current worldview is that they are blameless but stagnant. Is this really desirable? Or is it better, as a rational criticism approach suggests, to be blameworthy but improvable?

No one will blame a paraplegic for not swimming to someone’s rescue. The pessimistic morality of victimhood would suggest that, in approaching life’s problems, it is better to be crippled than capable of failure. This is horrible.

Compulsive eating, anger issues, depression, addiction to substances … these are just a few of the serious problems people try and shift responsibility for. And for what? The pain of the fear that will occur when one looks into the mirror and realizes the force responsible for the issue is looking at them?

This is not to say that these are easy or trivial problems to solve, of course. It is merely to say that it is far better to be on the hook morally for potential failure, than off the hook categorically due to an inability to act. Blameworthiness indicates responsibility, and thus the potential for excellence. Truly, blameworthiness is an exalted state, and one should embrace it, rather than hide from it.

I’d make a joke about how you can’t spell blameworthiness without worthiness, but that would veer the post into dangerously mainstream self-help territory ;)

The Morality of Democracy, Foreign Policy, and the Financial Crisis

09-Nov-09

A form of argument I’ve commonly encountered when debating people on the morality of foreign intervention to promote democracy is the following:

“So, if you think Democracy is so great that it is worth initiating wars over, how can you justify putting pressure on / intervening against democracies when they vote for people you consider ‘bad’? Surely your love of democracy means you have to respect the results of the sovereign people?”

Well, no. Popper crushes this argument, arguing, to use a very crude analogy, that the fact that democracies sometimes fail is no more an argument against democracy than the fact that toilets get clogged is an argument against in-door plumbing; furthermore, to tease out a fairly obvious implication, an advocate of democracy is being no more self-contradictory in advocating use of coercive measures against democracies when they fail and become a nuisance, then an advocate of indoor plumbing is self-contradictory by acknowledging that plungers are sometimes necessary. (The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume One, Pg 124-125) (large excerpt follows, because his argument is worth reproducing in detail):

“…it is not difficult to show that a theory of democratic control can be developed which is free from the paradox of sovereignty. The theory I have in mind is one which does not proceed, as it were, from a doctrine of the intrinsic goodness or righteousness of a majority rule, but rather from the baseness of tyranny ; or more precisely, it rests upon the decision, or upon the adoption of the proposal, to avoid and to resist tyranny.

For we may distinguish two main types of government. The first type consists of governments of which we can get rid without bloodshed — for example, by way of general elections ; that is to say, the social institutions provide means by which the rulers may be dismissed by the ruled, and the social traditions ensure that these institutions will not easily be destroyed by those who are in power. The second type consists of governments which the ruled cannot get rid of except by way of a successful revolution — that is to say, in most cases, not at all. I suggest the term ‘democracy’ as a short-hand label for a government of the first type, and the term ‘tyranny’ or ‘dictatorship’ for the second. This, I believe corresponds closely to the traditional usage. But I wish to make clear that no part of my argument depends on the choice of these labels; and should anybody reverse this usage (as is frequently done nowadays), then I should simply say that I am in favour of what he calls ‘tyranny’, and object to what he calls ‘democracy; and I should reject as irrelevant any attempt to discover what ‘democracy’ ‘really’ or ‘essentially’ means, for example, by translating the term into ‘the rule of the people’.  (For although ‘the people’ may influence the actions of their rules by the threat of dismissal, they never rule themselves in any concrete, practical sense.)

If we make use of the two labels as suggested, then we can now describe, as the principle of a democratic policy, the proposal to create, develop, and protect, political institutions for the avoidance of tyranny. This principle does not imply that we can ever develop institutions of this kind which are faultless or foolproof, or which ensure that the policies adopted by a democratic government will be right or good or wise — or even necessarily better or wiser than the policies adopted by a benevolent tyrant. (Since no such assertions are made, the paradox of democracy is avoided.) What may be said, however, to be implied in the adoption of the democratic principle is the conviction that the acceptance of even a bad policy in a democracy (as long as we can work for peaceful change) is preferable to the submission to a tyranny, however wise or benevolent. Seen in this light, the theory of democracy is not based upon the principle that the majority should rule; rather, the various equalitarian methods of democratic control, such as general elections and representative government, are to be considered as no more than well-tried and, in the presence of a widespread traditional distrust of tyranny, reasonably effective institutional safeguards against tyranny, always open to improvement, and even providing methods for their own improvement.

He who accepts the principle of democracy in this sense is therefore not bound to look upon the result of a democratic vote as an authoritative expression of what is right. Although he will accept a decision of the majority, for the sake of making the democratic institutions work, he will feel free to combat it by democratic means, and to work for its revision. And should he live to see the day when the majority vote destroys the democratic institutions, then this sad experience will tell him only that there does not exist a foolproof method of avoiding tyranny. But it need not weaken his decision to fight tyranny, nor will it expose his theory as inconsistent.”

Popper’s rejection of natural law sovereignty frees us from the moral paralysis we might otherwise encounter in our efforts to confront democracies gone awry. Instead, Popper offers a theory of democracy grounded in its instrumental utility in promoting moral ends, such as efficient problem solving and protecting liberty. So understood, there is no hypocrisy or immorality per se in promoting the development of a particular democracy on the one hand, and seeking to undercut a rogue and tyrannical, yet democratically-elected, regime on the other. The relevant moral analysis is not whether one is promoting democracy for its own sake, but whether one is promoting the ends democracy is supposed to serve.

We can take the structure of Popper’s analysis and apply it to those who’ve made the argument, in light of the financial crisis, that free market laissez-faire is dead, since one cannot tenably hold the market to be a moral system given its recent failures. The analytic structure is strikingly similar; markets, like the popular sovereigns under democratic natural law theory, are held to a presumption of infallibility, and the inevitable failure to meet this presumption is used as an opportunity for a calling-out of the advocates of free market and democracy as defenders of an impossible position. But of course, free marketeers do not argue that the free market won’t make mistakes, or even that it won’t make very large mistakes; the argument, simply, is that, in light of our best available theories, free markets are to be considered as no more than well-tried and reasonably effective institutions for the creation of wealth, always open to improvement, and even providing methods for their own improvement.

Markets, like democracy, are the worst form of social organization for their respective niche…except for all the others that have been tried. This is a laudable status for the two concepts, or any concept, because being the last theory standing is truly all a concept can hope for, and by embracing this status, the advocates for both theories can make their arguments much more powerful.

Indigo Children, ADHD, and a Couple of Analogies

08-Nov-09

Edited mildly for grammar and analogy clarity:

The debate around Indigo children is one of those things that leaves me dissatisfied all around.

Essentially,  the Indigo Children movement argues that some children are a quasi-magical next stage in human evolution. There’s some claim of paranormal abilities, but let’s put that aside and look at the more mundane characteristics:

Descriptions of indigo children include the belief that they are empathetic, curious, possess a clear sense of self-definition and purpose, strong-willed, independent, often perceived by friends or family as being weird, and also exhibits a strong inclination towards spiritual matters (e.g. God) from early childhood. Indigo children have also been described as having a strong feeling of entitlement, or “deserving to be here.” Other alleged traits include a high intelligence quotient, an inherent intuitive ability, and resistance to authority.

So in essence, they are curious, assertive, purposeful, and smart. Doesn’t sound like this needs its own useless New Age quasi-scientific concept, but doesn’t sound bad either.

According to research psychologist Russell Barkley, the New Age movement has yet to produce empirical evidence of the existence of indigo children and the 17 traits most commonly attributed to them were akin to theForer effect; so vague they could describe nearly anyone.

This could certainly be a legitimate critique…

Many children called indigo by their parents are diagnosed with ADHD. Robert Todd Carroll points out that labeling a child an indigo is an alternative to a diagnosis that implies imperfection, damage or mental illness, which may appeal to many parents, a belief echoed by many academic psychologists. He also points out that many of the commentators on the indigo phenomenon are of varying qualifications and expertise. Linking the concept of indigo children with the use of Ritalin to control ADHD, Carroll states “The hype and near-hysteria surrounding the use of Ritalin has contributed to an atmosphere that makes it possible for a book like Indigo Children to be taken seriously. Given the choice, who wouldn’t rather believe their children are special and chosen for some high mission rather than that they have a brain disorder?”

I don’t buy Indigo Children theory, but “brain disorder” is a very strong claim, and the tone of condescension in the quote is galling. Does the explanatory power of the theory back up the bold assertion? Some symptoms of ADHD:

  • Be easily distracted, miss details, forget things, and frequently switch from one activity to another
  • Have difficulty focusing on one thing
  • Become bored with a task after only a few minutes, unless they are doing something enjoyable
  • Have difficulty focusing attention on organizing and completing a task or learning something new

And there are various proposed explanations, including genetics, diet, and social factors, with no compelling explanatory model.

The symptoms above seem to boil down to “likes to change tasks often (apparently to the annoyance of others), except when the task is fun.”

I don’t think the alternative theory psychiatrists put forward (ADHD) is terribly more compelling than that of the Indigo Children movement. The Indigo Children movement’s theories may be more facially suspect, because they often involve explicitly paranormal and magical claims. But the specious approach of psychiatry  – which claims that children have brain disorders and wants to browbeat parents into giving children drugs for those disorders, based on some vague symptoms which could describe pretty much anyone and an explanatory framework which needs work —  has much to answer for as well.

This is frustrating. On the one hand, we have mystical people who think their children are magical and probably treat them somewhat better than the norm as a result (a similar phenomenon happens with many Aspies, I think). On the other hand, we have advocates of “science” who want to drug children for getting bored too easily because this means their brains must be broken.

What is the truer theory?

A relevant post from curi gives us some direction: in it, he uses a very fancy graph to make the point that as memes regarding child-rearing have changed, Asperger’s syndrome has skyrocketed.

In the thread that followed, an individual was very resistant to the notion that Asperger’s could be so meme-driven. I pointed out that people tend to systematically underestimate the degree to which old-school parenting memes were vicious and cruel to children. I would add that people tend to underestimate the degree to which memes, in *general*, can have a huge impact on the development of individuals in ways that give rise to traits which seem almost “inherent” or “biological.”

An analogy: New Yorkers are known for their propensity for jaywalking (or crossing in the middle of the street as opposed to the intersection). Mayor Giuliani tried to implement some measures to curtail this behavior (which he apparently disapproved of), including issuing citations and throwing up concrete barriers in some places to prevent people from doing so. But people carried on jaywalking anyways. Does this mean New Yorkers are an inherently less lawful people than, say, people in Singapore? No. New Yorkers may have some different values about respect for certain parts of the law. This difference in values could be overcome to bring about a change in behavior: New York Police Department snipers on roofs shooting people in the leg every time they tried to jaywalk would probably be sufficient. The “character” of New Yorkers afterwards would be different; it would seem tamed and cowed. But we’re not willing to go that far to change the behavior. Maybe a fascist regime would be willing, but not us.

One has to realize that up until fairly recently (in the history of mankind anyways), the parallel to shooting people in the leg was the default approach to child-rearing: disobedience was met with terrifying violence not even necessarily tied proportionally to the infraction, largely for the purpose of maintaining control, upholding parental authority for its own sake, and quieting the nuisance that children were thought to be. But then a huge shift in values occurred, and has continued to progress: the past few decades in our cultural history, we’ve suddenly started caring a lot more about the happiness of our own children, and about enabling them to find and pursue the things that will make them happy.

And we’re surprised that this has led to a huge number of children who act very different than children are “expected” to? And that one commonly identifiable problem is that children get bored easily, when for the longest time the culture didn’t bother creating any knowledge at all about how to help children find interesting things? To expect that children’s preferences would start to be taken seriously without their being some new problems arising from that due to  lack of cultural knowledge, is sort of like expecting the old Soviet Union to have transitioned smoothly from an authoritarian socialist regime to  a Hong Kong style free-market laissez faire system despite having no knowledge of how free markets work. It’s a necessary transition, but it’s going to be messy.

And so, not unlike the political debates that sometimes occur about things like democratic and market reforms in other countries, you have people decrying and mocking the effectiveness of the new approach because of some bumps in the road, advocating not that you go back to the old ways, but that you just need some modification and control (psychiatrists and left-of-center bureaucrats, respectively), and you have some people who want to bring back the old ways (authoritarians of politics and parenting), and you have some people who are in favor of the changes, but for not-quite-the-right reasons (Indigo Children movement types and democratic socialists).

NY Times: Misunderstanding Capitalism’s Premises

07-Nov-09

The New York Times offers a book review of a Rand biographer in which they fundamentally misunderstand  Rand’s vision of capitalism:

“When Bennett Cerf, a head of Random House, begged her to cut Galt’s speech, Rand replied with what Heller calls “a comment that became publishing legend”: “Would you cut the Bible?” …In fact, any editor certainly would cut the Bible, if an agent submitted it as a new work of fiction. But Cerf offered Rand an alternative: if she gave up 7 cents per copy in royalties, she could have the extra paper needed to print Galt’s oration. That she agreed is a sign of the great contradiction that haunts her writing and especially her life.”

Why would this be a contradiction?

“Politically, Rand was committed to the idea that capitalism is the best form of social organization invented or conceivable. This was, perhaps, an understandable reaction against her childhood experience of Communism… Yet while Rand took to wearing a dollar-sign pin to advertise her love of capitalism, Heller makes clear that the author had no real affection for dollars themselves. Giving up her royalties to preserve her vision is something that no genuine capitalist, and few popular novelists, would have done. It is the act of an intellectual, of someone who believes that ideas matter more than lucre.”

I see. It is only a contradiction if you think that capitalism, as opposed to being a system which makes possible the creation of wealth and the expression of different preferences for various goods and services (by allowing one to decide how much one will pay for them), is a system which imposes a mandate that one maximize the pursuit of wealth over all other values, and that if one considers oneself an advocate of capitalism, one is particularly bound to this notion of wealth-maximization.

Rand’s decision to take a royalty cut in exchange for the Galt speech being published is actually a perfect example of the capitalist ideal at work: it is an example of Rand valuing a particular service (the publishing of her novel intact) more than an alternative (higher compensation), and being willing to accept one in exchange for the other. A capitalist system which respects the rights of individuals makes such bargains possible.

Rand was not only one of the most forceful advocates of capitalism, but also one of the most articulate. The fact that her position could be misunderstood as advocating “higher profits at any costs,” especially when she spends so much of Atlas Shrugged critiquing those who use sway with the government to pursue such an approach, is problematic.

Do people have ideas on specific arguments to convince people of the truer position?

Desires and Nirvana

06-Nov-09

There are various theories as to what sort of state humans should try and get themselves in. This probably asks the wrong question (we should expect that people will wind up in a good mental state by solving problems, and focus on doing that, not the end result), but one approach seems worth talking about.
The Buddhist conception of Nirvana, which is considered the highest state in Buddhism, involves a lack of suffering, desire, or sense of self. This seems pretty bad on its face: while no suffering is awesome, having a sense of self and desires are good. Buddhism, I think, aims to eliminate the former by eliminating the latter.
Desires don’t cause suffering. Specific theories attached to desires to. For instance, right now I very much desire a new computer. Am I sad I don’t have one? No (well, not most of the time!). That’d be silly. There’s a whole universe of things worth desiring out there, and I’m rational enough to realize that it’s a lot more fruitful to figure out what the most interesting and important ones are and happily pursue those, than irrationally sulk about my not having them.
There are many times, however, where people fall short of this ideal of happy, rational pursuit of desired ends. Physical attraction is a common one. You want someone – they don’t reciprocate. It hurts. Why? It is because you think you should have them. At some level, you think that it’s wrong that you can’t have them; the state of not having them causes an expectation of yours not to be met. This causes pain.
Romance is a loaded example, so let’s try another. Say you make plans to go to the movies with someone. You go; they don’t show up and can’t be reached. You get mad. Should you? While some amount of anger in this situation seems pretty defensible, it’s not; what purpose does it serve? Sure, people should let you know when they’re not going to be able to make it, and you’ll take the possibility of that happening into account when making plans with this person the next time. But it’s not some injustice in the situation that’s causing you to be mad – it is your belief that getting mad is an appropriate reaction. Instead, you should be figuring out how to best spend your time that evening (see the movie anyway, go home and play video games, whatever).
So does this mean that the solution is not wanting other people physically, or not wanting to see movies, or not wanting anything? No, that’s silly. Buddhism proves too much. On the other hand, it does say you can feel better about things by changing your memes, which is notable. But its end goals are bad.
The better approach is always trying to maximize your happiness from whatever place you find yourself. Don’t cease desiring – but stop letting the gap between your expectations and what actually happens be a justification for self-inflicted pain. Instead, try reminding yourself of the pretty awesome premises that often are below the surface of the situations you are torturing yourself about. Knowing people worth wanting physically, for instance, is pretty cool (well, assuming you have good values about that kind of thing).